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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of
the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. et al. v.
LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 91-155.
Argued March 25, 1992-Decided June 26, 1992
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns and
operates three major airports in the New York City area and
controls certain terminal areas at the airports (hereinafter
terminals), adopted a regulation forbidding, inter alia, the
repetitive solicitation of money within the terminals. However,
solicitation is permitted on the sidewalks outside the terminal
buildings. Petitioner International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., a not-for-profit religious corporation whose
members, among other things, solicit funds in public places to
support their movement, brought suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the
regulation deprived them of their First Amendment rights. The
District Court granted petitioner summary judgment, concluding
that the terminals were public fora, and that the regulation
banning solicitation failed because it was not narrowly tailored
to support a compelling state interest. The Court of Appeals
reversed as here relevant. It determined that the terminals are
not public fora, and found that the ban on solicitation was
reasonable.
Held:
1. An airport terminal operated by a public authority is a
non-public forum, and thus a ban on solicitation need only
satisfy a reasonableness standard. Pp.4-10.
(a) The extent to which the Port Authority can restrict
expressive activity on its property depends on the nature of the
forum.
Regulation of traditional public fora or designated public fora
survives only if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest, but limitations on expressive activity conducted
on any other government-owned property need only be reasonable to
survive. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,
460 U.S. 37, 45, 46. Pp.4-5.
(b) Neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be
described as public fora. Airports have not historically been
made available for speech activity. Given the lateness with
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly
qualifies as a property that has "immemorially . . . time out of
mind" been held in the public trust and used for the purposes of
expressive activity. See Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515. Nor have airport operators
opened terminals to such activities, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802, as evidenced by
the operators' frequent and continuing litigation in this area.
Pp.6-7.
(c) That speech activities may have historically occurred at
"transportation nodes" such as rail and bus stations, wharves,
and Ellis Island is not relevant. Many of these sites
traditionally have had private ownership. In addition, equating
airports with other transportation centers would not take into
account differences among the various facilities that may affect
the extent to which such facilities can accommodate expressive
activity. It is unsurprising to find differences among the
facilities. The Port Authority, other airport builders and
managers, and the Federal Government all share the view that
terminals are dedicated to the facilitation of efficient air
travel, not the solicitation of contributions. Pp.7-10.
2. The Port Authority's ban on solicitation is reasonable.
Solicitation may have a disruptive effect on business by slowing
the path of both those who must decide whether to contribute and
those who must alter their paths to avoid the solicitation. In
addition, a solicitor may cause duress by targeting the most
vulnerable persons or commit fraud by concealing his affiliation
or shortchanging purchasers. The fact that the targets are
likely to be on a tight schedule, and thus are unlikely to stop
and complain to authorities, compounds the problem. The Port
Authority has determined that it can best achieve its legitimate
interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that
travelers are not interfered with unduly by limiting solicitation
to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals.
That area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport
users, making petitioner's access to the general public quite
complete.
Moreover, it would be odd to conclude that the regulation is
unreasonable when the Port Authority has otherwise assured access
to a universally travelled area. While the inconvenience caused
by petitioner may seem small, the Port Authority could reasonably
worry that the incremental effects of having one group and then
another seek such access could prove quite disruptive. Pp.10-12.
925 F.2d 576, affirmed in part.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in Part I of which Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we consider whether an airport terminal operated
by a public authority is a public forum and whether a regulation
prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport terminal
violates the First Amendment.
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) is
a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a
ritual known as sankirtan. The ritual consists of -`going into
public places, disseminating religious literature and soliciting
funds to support the religion."' 925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991).
The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the
movement. Ibid.
Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police
superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
and was charged with enforcing the regulation at issue. The Port
Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater
New York City area: John F. Kennedy International Airport
(Kennedy), La Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark
International Airport (Newark). The three airports collectively
form one of the world's busiest metropolitan airport complexes.
They serve approximately 8% of this country's domestic airline
market and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market. By
decade's end they are expected to serve at least 110 million
passengers annually. Id., at 578.
The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a
regulated profit. Id., at 581. Most space at the three airports
is leased to commercial airlines, which bear primary
responsibility for the leasehold. The Port Authority retains
control over unleased portions, including La Guardia's Central
Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy's International Arrivals
Building, and Newark's North Terminal Building (we refer to these
areas collectively as the "terminals"). The terminals are
generally accessible to the general public and contain various
commercial establishments such as restaurants, snack stands,
bars, newsstands, and stores of various types. Id., at 578.
Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related
to air travel. These visitors principally include passengers,
those meeting o